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THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA: THE QUIET COURT IN
AN UNQUIET COUNTRY
RONALD I. CHEFFINS- :

The title of this brief commentary on the Supreme Court of
Canada in 1965 was not casually chosen. The definition, or at least
one of the definitions offered for the word "quiet" in the Winston
dictionary is "subdued and modest". The word "unquiet" in the same
dictionary is defined as "restless, disturbed, agitated". These words
seem to describe to me the peculiar position of the Supreme Court
of Canada in a very restless country, undergoing substantial political,
social and legal change. In my view the Court is playing a relatively
moderate role, particularly in the last two or three years, with
relation to these very important changes. It appears as if the Court
is being by-passed as an important arena for the making of vital
constitutional decisions. I propose to examine in this article, which
constitutes a foreword to a series of case comments on decisions
handed down by the Court, the reason for the relatively subdued role
it has played, or has been permitted to play, in the area of exercising
power with respect to the country's constitutional future. Furthermore, I will endeavour to comment on two recent articles in law
journals criticising, respectively, the jurisdiction and organization of
the Court. It is important, in my view, that someone speak on behalf
of the existing judicial structure and jurisdiction. If there are to be
substantial changes in our constitutional system it should not come
about by default. This is an era in which it is not particularly fashionable to be a conservative, in the sense of defending existing institutions, but it is my firm belief that merely because an institution
exists does not mean that it must automatically be changed. Conversely, this is not to say that mere existence should guarantee permanence. The proper stance, in my view, is that before changing an
existing institution one should understand clearly the reasons for the
existing arrangement. It is only when these are no longer valid that
the task of finding a new form to replace the already functioning
structure should begin. The proponents of dhange must not only
demonstrate, by specific example, where the Court has failed to serve
Canada, but must show that any proposed new system will probably
be a substantial improvement on the existing system. As just indicated, the various criticisms of the present organization and functioning of the Court will be examined in more detail later in this article.
Before temporarily leaving this subject, however, I am not in any
way suggesting that the Supreme Court of Canada has necessarily
been an ideal Court, and that its structure should be accepted without question. One of the chief handicaps under which the Court has
laboured is that it has functioned with such a high degree of anony* Associate Professor of Public Law, University of Victoria; member of
the Bar of British Columbia.
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mity. The fact that it has not been more of a focal point in our constitutional system has, in my view, weakened rather than strengthened
the Court. Therefore, the writer welcomes these questions raised
about the Court if, for no other reason, than that they focus our
attention upon it, and allow its position in our constitutional system
to be examined, questioned and even defended.
It is significant that the task of doing an annual review of the
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada was begun only two years
ago by a Canadian law journal. Contrast this with the innumerable
reviews done in the United States by lawyers and political scientists
every year on the work of their own Supreme Court. For example,
in the one week preceding the writing of these words I received two
off-prints of articles, one by a political scientist and the other by
a leading law teacher, commenting on the work of the United States
Supreme Court.1 Americans, of course, have always been intrigued
by their Supreme Court, because it has given them innumerable occasions for comment, debate, and often anger. They, or at least large
numbers of them, have a peculiar love-hate relationship with their
Supreme Court. Very few politically aware Americans are indifferent
to its functioning. During the early 1930's, that group of American
opinion, usually identified as liberal, vehemently attacked the Court
for its role in declaring unconstitutional a substantial portion of congressional legislation passed by the New Deal Congress of that period.
This group of liberal opinion was very bitter about the Supreme
Court, labelling it as "nine old men" and similar such epithets of
derision. At the same time, that group of persons, usually in the
United States collectively referred to as conservatives, defended the
active role being played by the Court, arguing that it was a bastion
protecting traditional American values and American methods of
economic and business operation. In the sixties the cycle has come
full-circle in that the liberals now regard the Court as a bulwark
against infringement on civil liberties by legislatures of the states
and the National Congress, whereas traditional conservative opinion
often regards the Court as being too ready to intervene in the constitutional system by striking down congressional legislation or by
intruding upon such traditional American practices as the right to
have a school prayer in the public schools. Certain right-wing extremists have even gone so far as to consider the Court as the instrument
of a leftist conspiracy and have from time to time formed movements
devoted to the impeachment of the Chief Justice, Mr. Earl Warren.
Could one for a moment imagine a movement being formed in Canada
to "impeach Taschereau"? First of all, it is doubtful whether, leaving
aside lawyers and law students, one person in Canada out of fifty
thousand could name the Chief Justice of Canada. Furthermore, it
would be interesting to know how many first-year law students, even
1 P.C. Bartholomew, The Supreme Court of the United States, 1964-1965

(1965), 18 Western Political Quarterly 267 and P.K. Freund, The Supreme

Court: A Tale of Two Terms (1965), 26 Ohio State Law Journal 225.
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after three or four months of legal studies, could name all nine
members of the Supreme Court of Canada.
In an earlier article I advanced the theme that the power and
aggressiveness of the United States Supreme Court had had a very
important and beneficial influence on American legal education. It
was maintained that:
Every American law student is imbued from his first week at law school
with the view that the United States Supreme Court is second to no other
institution in the country in prestige and importance. Canadian law
students, however, do not have the same feeling about their courts. The
Supreme Court of Canada is much less a focal point of interest for the
of its more conservative
average Canadian lawyer or law student because
role in the governmental system of Canada.2
The provocative and intellectually stimulating opinions written by
many United States Supreme Court judges have made American law
schools in many respects more exciting places than their Canadian
counterparts. The opinions of Holmes, Brandeis, Frankfurter, Douglas,
Black and many other members of this Court are brilliant pieces of
intellectual writing, which cannot help but stimulate classroom as
well as public discussion. The United States Supreme Court has done
more than that, it has underlined the important role which the lawyer
and the judiciary play in the main-stream of American life. The
United States Supreme Court has shown that a court can be more
than a mere mechanical interpreter of words contained in a statute;
it can be the ultimate decision-maker in deciding which values are
to be protected and enhanced within a national constitutional system.
Many of the judgments written by Justices of the American Supreme
Court are essays on the theory of the state, and of the relationship
between the citizens and the state. Now this is not to say that everything the United States Supreme Court has done or is doing is
laudatory or should necessarily be emulated by the judiciary in
Canada. A strong argument can be made out that the courts in the
United States, particularly the United States Supreme Court have
been too militant in their activity, and have perhaps moved beyond
the proper role of the judiciary. There is still much to be said for
the argument that members of the judiciary are essentially the
nominees of one or two men and that they should not usurp the
role of decision-makers who have a mandate from the electorate.
Nevertheless, irrespective of how one decides this debate, the role
taken by the United States Supreme Court has proved to be a source
of great stimulus to American law teachers and students. For example, one seminar at Yale Law School, conducted by Professor Fred
Rodell, consists of each student in the seminar being asked to read
all the particular judgments, or as many as possible, written by a
certain judge. Every ofher member of the seminar is similarly
assigned another member of the Supreme Court whose life and judgments he also studies. Professor Rodell then submits to the seminar
2 R.I. Cheffins, Canadian-U.S. Legal Education Compared (1965), 8 Can.
Bar J. 170, at p. 171.
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a problem in constitutional law. In the light of what the student has
learned about his particular judge, he is asked to write the kind of
judgment which he thinks that particular judge would render if
faced with the assigned problem as a case before the court. The
purpose of this type of seminar is to teach students about the Constitution and its interpretation by the courts, but more than that it
illustrates the fact that judges often are rather consistent in their
approach to particular legal problems. In other words, it emphasizes
the fact that judges are human, that they bring to bear on every
legal problem certain human predilections and prejudices. The result
of a Rodell seminar is that a student not only learns a good deal
about American constitutional law but also a good deal about the
American legal realist approach to a legal system. It is also a very
stimulating method of studying the subject. To the best of my
knowledge no similar style of approach has ever been adopted with
respect to the Canadian Supreme Court. Admittedly it would be
much more difficult to follow the system used by Professor Rodell,
though it is my contention that it would not be impossible to do so.
Furthermore, to be more specific, it is my view that one can see
within certain Canadian judges a tendency to follow a relatively
predictable approach to certain types of legal problems. For example,
in the field of criminal law the tendency of Mr. Justice Fauteux is
to render judgments which in areas of doubt tend to restrict the
liberty of the accused, whereas Mr. Justice Cartwright is much more
prone to resolve any legal doubt in favour of the accused. In the
area of administrative law it is of interest to note that a good many
of the leading opinions in this field are written by Mr. Justice Judson.
Furthermore, it is my conclusion that he usually takes an opinion
which would restrict the right of the courts to control administrative
action. In other words, he is not particularly sympathetic to a line
of argument that would excessively judicialize the administrative
process. In this respect it is my view that he, along with most of the
Supreme Court judges, is rather more conservative in his approach
to administrative law problems than are many of the judges of the
provincial Courts of Appeal, many of whom are much more easily
persuaded to strike down administrative action on the grounds that
certain procedures were not observed. 3 These remarks should not
necessarily be construed as a criticism of Mr. Justice Judson, because
there is much to be said for the view that the Court should not force
all administrative tribunals and administrative authorities into following patterns of procedure which are replicas of those followed by
the courts. It would be interesting to analyse various areas of Canadian law, and determine whether certain judges tend to follow certain
lines of approach in rendering decisions in various areas of law. The
fact that really so little is known, or at least commented upon, about
the behaviour of our Supreme Court judges in specific fields is indica3 Typical of this trend is the decision handed down last year In Guay v.
Lafleur, [19651 S.C.R. 12.
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tive of my general thesis that the Court, particularly as compared to
its American counterpart, works in relative anonymity.
There are a variety of reasons why the Court plays a rather
quiet role in the Canadian legal system. The Court exercises judicial
restraint largely because of its acceptance of the concept of the
supremacy of Parliament; the notion that, as long as the federal
and provincial legislatures are acting within their assigned legislative
spheres their enactments cannot be rendered invalid by the courts.
This, of course, can be compared with the American concept which
allows the courts to declare invalid any legislation which transgresses
those entrenched portions of state and federal constitutions protecting
human rights. This, in effect, has meant that there is no Act of either
the United States Congress or a state legislature which cannot be
overruled as being unconstitutional by at least some part of the
American judiciary. Through their role as ultimate interpreters of
the constitutions of the states and of the United States generally,
American judges always have the effective last word in deciding
whether a statute violates the fundamental guarantees of either a
state or the National Constitution. No serious student of the United
States Constitution has in recent years argued that the ultimate
weapon of judicial review should not be in the hands of the courts,
yet there has been considerable debate over the extent to which it
should be used. Much of American constitutional law debate centres
around whether the United States Supreme Court should be so quick
and ready to intervene in the matters brought before it. One line of
opinion, whidh was reflected in the judgments of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, was that Congress and the state legislatures should be the
fundamental decision-makers within the nation and that the courts
should intervene to declare Acts of Congress unconstitutional only
in rare and relatively clear circumstances. Certainly the present trend
of the Court has been more towards judicial activism, in the sense
that the Court has shown little reluctance to interfere in what certainly would in Canada be considered an area of decision-making that
should be left for legislative competence. This is not to imply that
the Supreme Court of Canada has been totally passive and submissive
in the exercise of its responsibilities. Through the use of the principles of statutory interpretation and, more particularly, in exercising
its right of declaring whether a statute was passed by a legislative
body having jurisdiction under the British North America Act, the
Supreme Court of Canada has been able to render ultra vires some
undesirable legislation. Particularly notable in this respect were the
decisions rendered in the case of Switzman v. Elbling (the Padlock
case) 4 and in the Alberta Press Bill case.5 In both those cases the
Supreme Court of Canada was able to declare that these provincial
legislative enactments were dealing with subjects beyond those
allowed the provinces by the British North America Act. Nevertheless, by and large, the Supreme Court of Canada has acknowledged
4

Switzman vi.EIbing and A.-G. Que., [19571 S.C.R. 285.

S Reference re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100.
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the doctrine of the supremacy of the legislature, and has refused to
strike down as unconstitutional legislative action, except on the
ground that it was outside the defined boundaries of legislative power
as delineated by the British North America Act. It is my view that
this doctrine of the Supremacy of Parliament has been the most
important concept in defining the role of our courts. Once again this
is not necessarily to imply that this is altogether bad, because certainly a strong argument can be made that the basic political decisions should be made by the legislature, rather than by an appointed
body. It is arguable that the United States Supreme Court has established in recent years extreme precedents with respect to the role
which the highest Court in the land should play. At the same time,
the United States would be a much less happy place today, if it had
not been for the vigorous and vital role the Court has assumed in
protecting certain civil liberties.
There are, however, other factors besides the doctrine of the
supremacy of Parliament which have militated against a more aggressive role for the Supreme Court of Canada. The first of these limitations is one that was self-imposed, namely, that the Court is bound
by its own previous decisions. This basic proposition was a selfimposed restraint emanating from a decision of the Court in 1909,
namely Stuart v. Bank of Montreal.6 Andrew Joanes, in an analysis
of the decisions since the Stuart case, argues that the Court is probably still bound "by its own previous decisions, subject to the meaningless 'exceptional circumstances' qualification". 7 Furthermore, he
contends that the Court is bound by the pre-1949 Privy Council
decisions in cases which emanated from Canada, and that it is possible that the Court is also bound by the House of Lords. These are
limitations which, as already mentioned, are self-imposed by the
Court and are not legal restraints emanating from a statutory or
other constitutional source. It certainly is unfortunate that the Court
should adopt this position, though it can perhaps be defended in
constitutional cases on the ground that vast administrative empires
were created and have operated for many years on the basis of
previous decisions, and that a capricious overruling of these decisions
would tend to destroy well entrenched governmental structures and
practices. This is certainly a sound argument, at least with respect
to certain constitutional decisions, however, with respect to certain
areas of private law, and particularly criminal law, the doctrine that
the Court is bound by itself is most unfortunate. To argue that the
Court can always distinguish a decision that it finds undesirable is,
in my view, an unsatisfactory answer. The proper position is that a
court should be reluctant to overrule a previous decision, but should
6 (1909), 41 S.C.R. 516.
7 A. Joanes, Stare Decisis in the Supreme Court of Canada (1958), 36
Can. Bar Rev. 175, at p. 189.
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be quite willing to do so clearly, cleanly and decisively if 8it feels that
the previous decision is no longer legally or socially valid.
Many of the problems surrounding the creation and functioning
of the Supreme Court of Canada stem from the fact that the Court
was not created by the British North America Act, in the sense that
the structure, organization and jurisdiction of the Court are not
defined by that Statute. The general tendency of the men responsible
for the British North America Act was to put into that document
only those details which were fundamentally necessary to the immediate functioning of the new nation. It was necessary, for example,
to create new legislative bodies for Ontario and Quebec, as prior to
union both these areas of the country were part of one legal area,
namely the Province of Canada. Similarly it was necessary to set up
a Federal Parliament, and to define the method of appointing and
electing its members, so that it could begin immediately to exercise
its responsibilities. Again it was fundamental immediately to try to
define in the Act the basic division of legislative power. With respect,
however, to the Supreme Court of Canada, it must have obviously
been felt that the Court's creation was a long term goal, and that
the details of its establishment, function and organization did not
require immediate action, but could be dealt with later, once the new
nation became more firmly established. This attitude was probably
furthered by the fact that the various provincial courts of appeal
would continue to function after the creation of the nation, and that
there always remained as an ultimate source of judicial power the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
The constitutions of both Australia and the United States guarantee that there shall be a national constitutional court guaranteed by
the fundamental law of the constitution. 9 In Canada, on the other
hand, the B.N.A. Act, section 101, merely states that, "The Parliament of Canada may ...
provide for the Constitution, Maintenance,
and Organization of a General Court of Appeal for Canada, . . ."
Thus, if and when the Court was to be constituted, it would be merely
by an act of the Federal Parliament, rather than by inclusion in the
basic constitutional document.
Shortly after Confederation at least two attempts were made
to pass legislation to establish the Supreme Court of Canada. It was,
however, not until 1875 that the Supreme Court of Canada was
8 In a very interesting article, Dr. Horace Read commented extensively
on the effects on Canadian judicial decision-making of the adherence to stare
decisis and legislative supremacy. He is not suggesting that the courts should
replace the legislatures as ultimate law makers, but that, within the area

of freedom which the courts have in our system, they must use their creative

powers to a maximum extent. As he points out, this has not always been the

case. H. Read, The Judicial Process in Common Law Canada (1959), 37 Can.
Bar Rev. 265.
9 See U.S. Constitution, article 3, secs. I and 2 and Commonwealth of
Australia Constitution Act, 1900 (Imp.) c. 12, ss. 71 and 73.
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created by Federal statute. 10 From the beginning of its existence,
and even before, tremendous controversy raged as to whether the
Supreme Court of Canada should have final jurisdiction on appeals
brought to it. In rather typical Canadian style the phrase in the
statute dealing with the subject of appeals was extremely ambiguous;
on the one hand seeming to render the Supreme Court of Canada the
final court for all potential Canadian appeals, yet in the latter part
of the relevant section there was retained "the right which Her
Majesty may be graciously pleased to exercise as her royal prerogative",1 with respect to judicial matters. It was on the basis of this
latter phrase that continued appeals to the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council were justified. Particularly significant, however,
and perhaps almost as important as the retention of appeals was
the fact that there was legal recourse direct from the provincial
courts to the Privy Council. This meant that the Supreme Court of
Canada could be by-passed entirely by a litigant, and accordingly
there were few, if any, valid reasons why litigants should bother
going through the time consuming and expensive process of going
to the Supreme Court before proceeding to the Judicial Committee.
Thus it must be kept in mind that many of the important decisions
whidh affected the division of power in Canada were never heard
by the Supreme Court of Canada at all. 12 Even after establishment,
the Court was not readily accepted as a necessary addition to the
Canadian constitutional structure. In 1879 and 1880 Bills were introduced into the House of Commons urging the abolition of the Court,
though both were defeated after lively debate. Evidently the critics
had a number of salient and valid points to make about the quality
of the decisions already rendered by the Court and the time taken in
handing them down. The Court, 'however, gradually overcame its
initial problems of administration and rather weak personnel to
become an effectively functioning judicial body.
Mr. Justice Laskin (then Professor Laskin) points out that
initially the Court, in constitutional matters, took the position that
national problems should be dealt with by the Federal Parliament,
and that provincial legislative authority should be held within rather
narrow limits.' 3 He argues that, largely as a result of the binding
effect of Privy Council decisions, the Court began to shift its ground
and render decisions which largely tended to uphold the validity of
provincial legislation. He points out, for example, the significant
difference in the judgments of the Supreme Court judges in the
Insurance Reference case14 as compared with judgments of their
10 For an interesting summary of the steps preceding, and the events
which followed immediately after the establishment of the Supreme Court
of Canada see the article by Frank MacKinnon, The Establishment of the
Supreme Court of Canada (1946), 27 Canadian Historical Review 258.
11 Ibid., p. 262.
12 For example, the leading constitutional decision in Toronto Electric
Commissionersv. Snider, [19251 A.C. 396.
13 B. Laskin, The Supreme Court of Canada: A Final Court of and for
Canadians (1951), 29 Can. Bar Rev. 1038.
14 In re CanadianInsurance Act, 1910 (1913), 48 S.C.R. 260.
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judicial predecessors in the Parsons case. 15 It will always remain the
great unanswered question of Canadian constitutional law just what
effect the Privy Council decisions had on the later judgments rendered by the Supreme Court of Canada. It is, however, quite possible
that even if there had not been an ultimate appeal to the Privy
Council, the general tendency of the Supreme Court of Canada would
have been to cut down, at least to some extent, the very clearly
delineated powers of the Federal Parliament as defined by the British
North America Act. It could be argued that the type of strong federal
government envisaged by the political founders of the Canadian
nation was impractical and not realizable in a country as large
geographically and as culturally diverse as Canada. It could also be
argued that the Judicial Committee was recognizing the realities of
the social and political life of the nation in upholding the validity
of provincial statutes. On the other hand it could be maintained that
if the Privy Council had not ruled the way it did, then the provincial
governments would never have assumed the importance which they
did, and thus their position would not have to be continually sustained
by judicial decisions. Nevertheless the essential point made by Mr.
Justice Laskin is that, for the most part, the majority of Supreme
Court of Canada judgments in constitutional cases tended to render
provincial legislation valid, and that of the Federal Parliament ultra
vires.
The details of the political and legal steps leading to abolition
of appeals to the Privy Council have already been well documented
and it is unnecessary to repeat them here. 16 The end of appeals to
the Privy Council was greeted by most English speaking Canadians
interested in constitutional matters with considerable satisfaction. As
will be shown later, some French speaking Canadians viewed this
event with mixed feelings. The satisfaction over the abolition of
appeals to the Privy Council was based on two major grounds: first,
the purely nationalistic feeling that it was not fitting for an independent nation to have to go outside its borders for ultimate judicial
decision-making, and secondly, the feeling that perhaps the Supreme
Court of Canada would develop a case law, particularly in the constitutional field, which would be considerably more favourable to the
position of the Federal Parliament. In the ten years following abolition of appeals to the Privy Council, there was a particularly exciting
period in our legal history. During this time the Supreme Court of
Canada had before it a number of especially interesting cases, which
raised important questions of civil liberties. The Court was given the
15 Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons (1880), 4 S.C.R. 215.

16 G. R. Logan, Historical Sketch of the Supreme Court of Canada (1964),
3 Osgoode Hall L.J. 171. See also Pierson, Canada and the Privy Council,
ch. 7, pp. 69-94.
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imagination and scope in renderopportunity to exercise considerable
17
ing its decisions in these matters.
The Quebec provincial election of 1960, which brought to power
a new government headed by Mr. Jean Lesage, was to prove of great
significance in terms of Canadian political life, and in particular
with respect to the future role of the Supreme Court. It is impossible
to outline at this time the tremendous changes in Canada's political
and constitutional structure since 1960, however one effect of these
events, in my opinion, has been a decline of the Supreme Court of
Canada as a decision-maker with respect to the allocation of FederalProvincial legislative power. The frequency of Federal-Provincial
conferences on a whole variety of subjects has, in my view, tended
to keep litigation out of the courts on the question of the division
of legislative power. It seems to me that there has been a decline in
the use of the reference case as a means of putting before the courts
questions of constitutional importance. There seems little doubt that
Mr. Lesage would prefer that Federal-Provincial jurisdictional problems be resolved in the political arena rather than having them become disputes or references before the courts. This attitude is certainly reflected in his hostility to the reference by the Federal Cabinet
to the Supreme Court of Canada of the question of off-shore mineral
rights. Mr. Lesage even hinted that Quebec might not recognize the
validity of the judgment rendered by that Court on this question.
Since it seems that fewer references are now being brought to the
Court on constitutional questions, the opportunity for the Court to
exercise a leading constitutional role is considerably diminished.
Furthermore, many of the leading decisions on questions of civil
liberties originated in the Province of Quebec. Since the coming to
power of the Lesage government there has been considerably less
persecution of groups such as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Communist Party, therefore, this has also meant that some of the very
stimulating cases of the Fifties no longer arise. In addition, the Bill
of Rights, which was potentially a source of considerable litigation,
and originally seemed to offer the Supreme Court of Canada an opportunity to enhance its role, has not produced the expected flow of
cases before the courts. For example, looking over the cases decided
by the Supreme Court in 1965 one notes that the largest number
of legal problems faced by the Court were in the areas of criminal
law, contract, wills, municipal law and, to a somewhat lesser degree,
administrative law. It is particularly interesting to note the relative
paucity of constitutional law issues dealt with by the Court. Only
17 Typical of some of the interesting cases of this era were Saumur v.
Quebec and Attorney-GeneraZ for Quebec, [19531 2 S.C.R. 299, Chaput v.
Romain, [19551 S.C.R. 834, Lamb v Benoit [19591 S.C.R. 321, Suwitzman 'v.
Elb7ing and Attorney-GeneraZ for Quebec, 19571 S.C.R. 285, and Roncaremli
v. Duplessis, [19591 S.C.R. 121.
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three cases dealt with by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1965 deal
with the question of the division of legislative powers.18
The fact that the Court does not have as many interesting issues
to deal with as it had in the Fifties is, of course, no reflection whatsoever on the Court itself. In fact, one might argue that the absence
of civil liberties cases indicates a widespread recognition of human
rights within the nation, so that it is not necessary to seek legal
redress to protect one's personal liberties. Certainly the type of
flagrant disregard for personal freedom which characterized the
Province of Quebec in the era of Premier Duplessis seems, at least
temporarily, to have ceased. This factor, combined with my view that
there has been a decline in the use of the reference, as a method of
bringing issues before the Court, makes it therefore not surprising
that the issues which the Court has to resolve are perhaps not so
dramatic as those which faced it in the Fifties, and those which had
to be decided by the Privy Council. The salient point being made,
however, is that in a country torn with political dispute, the Court
seems almost isolated from the mainstream of decision-making. Whether this state of affairs will continue is difficult to predict but the
indications are that, at least for the next few years, most important
Federal-Provincial problems will probably be settled in non-judicial
arenas.
Any discussion of the present and future roles of the Supreme
Court would, as has already been partially pointed out, be meaningless without recognition of the social context in which the Court
functions. Due to political upheaval, there has been a shift away from
using the Court as the major vehicle for the resolution of disputes over
areas of provincial and federal legislative power. The recent push
by Quebec for increased autonomy, which has, in many instances,
had the backing of other provinces, has raised questions with respect
to the Court. It, like many other federal institutions, has come under
considerable scrutiny by Quebec political and legal circles, the result
being a demand for substantial change in our political and constitutional systems. These demands have ranged all the way from a desire
for a wholly new constitution, through to re-adjustments in taxing
and legislative power. There has not been, to my knowledge, any
suggestion that the personnel of the Supreme Court of Canada are
incompetent or that the Court has been derelict in its duty, or even
wrong in any of its lines of decision-making. The criticism has instead
centered on the much more fundamental questions of the organization, jurisdiction and role of the Court in the Canadian constitutional
system. First, it is appropriate to analyse the views of Professor
Albert Abel, a well known and well respected professor of law at the
University of Toronto, who recommends a major limitation on the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
18 McKay v. The Queen, [1965] S.C.R. 798; Attorney-General of B.C. v.
McKenzie, [19651 S.C.R. 490; Batary v. Attarney-GeneraZ of Saskatchewan
et al., [1965] S.C.R. 465. Even in the latter case the constitutionality of the
provincial legislation was only one aspect of the decision.
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In his article entitled "The Role of the Supreme Court in Private
Law Cases", 19 Professor Abel advances the thesis that. "the law of
the several provinces ought to be left for the provinces to determine
judicially, as it is legislatively". 20 He argues that the Supreme Court
ought to refrain from "reviewing any case which falls within the
range of matters of provincial concern-which, by and large, means
one with respect to property and civil rights". 21 Professor Abel then
goes on to develop a very well argued case for this proposition. He
suggests that perhaps it was intended at the time of Confederation
that the power to establish a general Court of Appeal for Canada
under Section 101 of the British North America Act did not envisage
the establishment of a court which would have overall appeal jurisdiction on matters of purely private concern. He argues that social
life varies from one province to another and that the provincial courts
are more aware of the social contexts of their regions, and therefore
they are the most appropriate bodies for ultimate judicial authority
on private law matters. Professor Abel makes it clear that he is
not in any way criticising the qualifications or the performance of
the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada, but rather, that the
chief reason for his proposed change is "the greater responsiveness22
of the law to the differing needs and sentiments of the provinces",
if this proposed change were brought about. There are a number of
questions which can be raised with respect to Professor Abel's
proposition. First, what about problems arising from the interpretation of federal statutes? Is it part of Professor Abel's proposal that
there should be a system of federal courts, starting with trial courts,
intermediate courts and ultimately appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada to deal with these matters? In my view the implementation
of his suggestion would lead to the adoption in Canada of a dual
system of courts, such as exists in the United States. Surely, if
appeals in the area of property and civil rights are to be withdrawn
from the Supreme Court, all questions revolving around the interpretation of federal statutes and federal areas of jurisdiction should
be originally litigated in a federal court. It has always been my view
that we have been rather blessed in not having the American dual
hierarchy of courts. This complicated and complex American system
has perhaps been financially beneficial to some lawyers in that considerable legal time is spent debating which hierarchy of courts has
jurisdiction in a particular case. Furthermore, it allows law teachers
to devote whole courses to this particular subject, but why should
we attempt to emulate this complex, time-consuming and expensive
dual system of courts? Surely it is desirable to promote a reasonable
degree of uniformity in the area of private law. We are in an era
of population and economic mobility, in whidh it is in the interests
of the national community that the law be relatively uniform, rather
19 A. Abel, The Role of the Supreme Court in Private Law Cases (1965),
4 Alta. Law Rev. 39.
20 Ibid., p. 39.
21 bid., p. 40.
22 Ibid., p. 47.
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than chopped up into ten separate watertight private law compartments. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of private law cases
are finally disposed of by the provincial courts. Even though a relatively small proportion of private law cases are appealed to the
Supreme Court of Canada, this brings some moderate and desirable
degree of uniformity and certainty in the law. This, in my view, is
particularly desirable in the area of commercial law where commercial practices do not differ greatly from province to province. Furthermore, in order to develop effectively the national economy, and to
promote the smooth working of our commercial system, the law should
be as uniform as possible.
If Professor Abel's proposal were adopted who would determine
what type of case could be appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada,
and what type of case should remain for sole determination within
the province? It is suggested that this could be done by restraint
on the part of the Supreme Court of Canada. Surely some definite
legislative statement would be needed on this particular subject?
Assume that the legislation did state that all legal disputes covered
by the term "property and civil rights" were not appealable to the
Supreme Court of Canada, which court or courts would have jurisdiction for determining whether a subject came within the term
"property and civil rights"? Furthermore, many of our most treasured fundamental liberties are protected by decisions in the area of
so-called private law. Does this mean that there is to be dramatic
diversity in the kind of civil liberties which a citizen enjoys in one
province as compared to another? As already pointed out, during
the Fifties most of our great civil liberties cases arose out of litigation in the area of What would usually be considered property and
civil rights. To strip the Court of this responsibility would be most
damaging, not only to the prestige of the Court but to the national
welfare of Canada. Admittedly there will always be some diversity
in the civil liberties enjoyed in one province as against another, but
surely we should fight to diminish this tendency rather than to
increase it.
Professor Abel's suggestion is by no means a new one. As far
back as the House of Commons debate on the subject of the establishment of the Supreme Court of Canada in 1875, a member of the
House of Commons, Mr. David Mills, objected to the fact that the
Bill setting up the Supreme Court of Canada gave appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of Canada over matters of private law.3
The Minister of Justice, the Honourable Telesphore Fournier, answered that, "the whole spirit of the Confederation Act was to give
the Court of Appeal jurisdiction over provincial as well as Dominion
law." 24 Since Mr. Fournier was in verbal communication with the
men who had brought about the union of Canada, his suggestion that
23 MacKinnon, op. cit., p. 261.
24 Ibid., p. 261.
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the intention of the Act was to provide a general court of appeal for
Canada, including control over provincial matters, tends to answer
the proposition put forward by Professor Abel that the Fathers of
Confederation may have had in mind the kind of limited jurisdiction
which he recommends.
In its report to the Quebec Government in 1956, a Quebec Provincial Royal Commission on constitutional matters also expressed
concern, similar to that of Professor Abel, about the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court. 25 The Commissioners pointed out that, as early
as 1903, a member of the House of Commons, Mr. Philip Demers,
had objected to the Supreme Court having jurisdiction in private
law matters. The Commission saw in the Supreme Court's ultimate
authority over civil law a dangerous possibility of legal centralisation.
A number of other views expressed by the Commission are reflected
in an article by Professor Morin and these will be analysed below in
discussing his views. The essential point is that Professor Abel's
argument is not entirely novel in the Canadian context, though his
is the most elaborate exposition of this point of view. For the reasons
outlined, it is my view that this change in the Court's jurisdiction
is unnecessary, particularly as regards appeals from the Englishspeaking common law provinces. The claims of Quebec to some special
consideration with respect to private law matters is obviously greater
than that of the English-speaking common law provinces, but even
here the Supreme Court of Canada usually functions so as to allow
decisions with respect to Quebec private law to be essentially controlled by the Civilian members of the Court. However, it is Professor
Abel's argument that though Quebec is not a province like the others,
this is true of all the other provinces, and they are entitled to the
same degree of private law variation as is Quebec. Though there may
be some justification in some degree of diversity in the common law
of the English-speaking provinces, it is my view that the possible
benefits accruing from this diversity are well outweighed by the
dangers of further legal fragmentation.
The criticisms and proposed dhanges in the jurisdiction and the
organization of the Supreme Court of Canada by Professor JacquesYvan Morin are of a much more drastic nature than those of Professor Abel. 26 Professor Morin begins by quoting both the Tremblay
Commission and Premier Jean Lesage to the effect that most of
French Canada has lost confidence in the Supreme Court of Canada,
on the ground that it is essentially a Court created by the Federal
Parliament, with its members appointed by the Federal Government.
It is his argument that French Canada cannot 'have confidence in a
Court of this kind which is not, in his view, independent of the Provincial and Federal Governments. He argues that the Court should
be established as part of the fundamental law of the Constitution
25 Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems,
4 vols., Quebec, 1956, hereinafter called the Tremblay Report.
26 J..Y. Morin, A Constitutional Court for Canada (1965), 43 Can. Bar
Rev. 545.
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rather than by federal statute. Earlier in this article the writer agreed
that this would have been a desirable inclusion in the British North
America Act, and certainly by itself is not an objectionable change
in our constitutional system. Professor Morin, however, implies that
since the judges are nominated by the Federal Government this makes
them prone to favour the federal authority in constitutional cases
dealing with the division of legislative power. On the contrary, the
Court has tended to render decisions on matters of legislative power
which, if anything, favoured provincial legislative claims.
Professor Morin suggests, as a minimal change, that the Supreme
Court of Canada be split into separate common law and civil law
chambers for the purpose of hearing private law cases, and that with
respect to constitutional matters the bench should be composed of
an equal number of common lawyers and civilians drawn from the two
aforementioned chambers. He feels, however, that a more preferable
solution would be to create a separate and distinct constitutional law
tribunal somewhat similar to that existing in Germany. He argues
that this constitutional court should be given a bi-national structure
in that the judges should be equally selected from English Canada
and French Canada. He proposes that these judges be selected by a
totally reformed Senate. This new Senate should be a bi-national
chamber with equal representation from English speaking Canada
and from French speaking Canada. In order for a person to receive
appointment to this new constitutional court he would have to obtain
a two-thirds majority from this newly created upper house. It is not
possible in this short paper to fully analyse all the implications of
Professor Morin's suggestions. It is sufficient, however, for the
moment, to raise one or two questions with respect to these suggested
changes. Since there are an even number of members on the proposed
constitutional court, what would happen if there were a deadlock?
Professor Morin does not suggest how this deadlock would be broken.
Furthermore, though the present method of appointment to the Court
is imperfect, his suggestion that appointees should receive a two-thirds
majority of the new bi-national upper house is, in my opinion, considerably more frightening. Is the appointment of judges to become
the subject of a national political wrangle? It is my suspicion that
the quality of men appointed would be inferior to those presently
serving on the Court. It is quite possible that only men of relatively
timid personality, with a lack of strong views, would ever receive
the approval of two-thirds of such a newly constituted upper house.
Perhaps, however, this is exactly what Professor Morin would like to
see, as towards the end of his article he decries the tendency of judges
to adapt the law of the Constitution to changing social and economic
circumstances. 27 He is very disturbed about the type of discretion
which many judges have exercised in interpreting constitutional
documents and statutes. He is particularly disturbed by the type of
judicial interpretation and judicial role assumed by the United States
27

Ibid., p. 551.
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Supreme Court. It is his view that a court should never fill the role
of the legislature. This is very difficult to implement in practice. Cases
come before courts because the constitution or statute is ambiguous,
or because the situation is not covered by existing law. It would create
great confusion if the courts decided to withhold a decision because
the constitution or a statute was unclear. Is it Professor Morin's view
that, in this event, the court should refer the matter to the legislative
branch of government for a decision? Furthermore, Professor Morin
seems to assume that if the courts interpret the Constitution in the
light of social and economic circumstances there will be an inevitable
tendency to interpret in a way favourable to the central government.
Is this an admission that the realities of social life in the twentieth
century require strong central government? Certainly the experience
in Canada has shown that what he calls the "instrumentalist attitude"
of the courts has led towards stronger provincial legislative authority
despite the wording of the British North America Act. Why does he
necessarily assume that the existing Supreme Court of Canada will
deviate from this past trend? Professor Morin objects to the use by
the Court of "a principle of growth". Would he object to this type of
approach if the growth were that of provincial legislative powers?
What, in my view, is particularly disturbing, is the assumption, both
by Professor Morin and the members of the Tremblay Commission,
that a judge will almost automatically tend to favour the government
which appointed him. If this is true of judicial behaviour, then the
courts should be scrapped in favour of arbitration boards. Furthermore, if this point of view is correct, no person would ever be acquitted
of a crime, since all judges are appointed and paid by the state.
The recommendations of change put forward by Professor Morin
are just part of a much larger constitutional debate and struggle now
being waged in Canada. The assumptions upon which our constitutional system has been based are now being questioned and criticized,
particularly by persons from Frendh speaking Canada. No part of
our constitutional process seems immune from criticism and proposed
change. There are always instances in which the criticisms are sound
and change is desirable. It is still, however, my assumption that the
onus is on the proponents of change to show that the new scheme
would be a substantial improvement on present arrangements.
Furthermore, it is my contention that the changes proposed by both
Professor Abel and Professor Morin would perhaps create more problems than they solve. Furthermore, it is significant to note that neither
of these gentlemen is willing to criticise the actual work done by
the Supreme Court of Canada. In fact Professor Abel specifically
mentions that the Supreme Court of Canada has done its work well.
In the case of Professor Morin, he does not give us any concrete
examples of where the Court has been biased against Quebec or has
shown any radical trend, since the abolition of appeals to the Privy
Council, in the direction of destroying provincial legislative authority.
As has been already pointed out, large areas of decision-making have
already shifted from the Court to other political arenas. It is, there-
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fore, difficult to see that the present functioning of the Court has
seriously jeopardised the political or legal status of the provinces.
Irrespective of one's views about the future structure of the Supreme
Court of Canada, all of these criticisms and questions with respect to
the Court's role, and to that of our political institutions, should be
welcomed. It forces us to examine, understand, appreciate and, if
necessary, change the defective parts of our constitutional system.

